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Abstract (217 words; max=250) 
The medial temporal lobe plays a critical role in recognition memory but, within the medial 
temporal lobe, the precise neural structures underlying recognition memory remain equivocal. In 
this study, visual paired comparison (VPC) was used to investigate recognition memory in a 
human patient (YR), who had a discrete lesion of the hippocampus, and a group of monkeys with 
neonatal hippocampal lesions, which included the dentate gyrus, and a portion of 
parahippocampal region. Participants were required to view a picture of an object on a coloured 
background. Immediately afterwards, this familiar object was shown again, this time paired with 
a novel object. All participants displayed a novelty preference, provided the background on 
which the objects were shown was the same as the one used during the learning phase.  When the 
background of the familiar object was changed between initial familiarization and test, only the 
control subjects showed a novelty preference; the hippocampal-lesioned monkeys and patient 
YR showed null preference. The results are interpreted within Eichenbaum and Bunsey’s 
(Eichenbaum & Bunsey (1995) Current Directions in Psychological Science, 4, 19-23) proposal 
that the hippocampus facilitates the formation of a flexible representation of the elements that 
make up a stimulus whereas the parahippocampal region is involved in the formation of a fused 
representation.  
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Introduction 
The ability to recognise familiar objects, scenes and faces is one of the most important cognitive 
functions in humans. Recognition can occur after a short or long period of time, in an old or new 
environment. The ability to recognize people and objects in different environments is 
fundamental for our social life, and this flexibility represents a specific feature of an effective 
memory system. There is current controversy regarding the precise neural structures underlying 
recognition memory. One view is that there is hippocampal involvement only when recognition 
depends upon the recollection of associations, such as those between an item and its context 
(Aggleton & Brown, 1999). According to this view, when recognition can be based on item 
familiarity alone, it relies not upon the hippocampus but upon the integrity of the perirhinal 
cortex. Recently, attempts have been made to differentiate the relative contributions to 
recognition memory of the hippocampus and parahippocampal region (comprising perirhinal 
cortex, parahippocampal cortex and entorhinal cortex). (See Eichenbaum et al., 2007 and Diana 
et al., 2007 for reviews.) Both Eichenbaum et al. and Diana et al. argue that the hippocampus is 
critical for recollection but not familiarity-based responses, and that it supports recollection by 
facilitating the association between item and contextual information. They suggest that the 
parahippocampal cortex also contributes to recollection, possibly through the encoding and 
retrieval of contextual information. They argue that, in contrast, the perirhinal cortex is involved 
in, and is essential for, familiarity-based recognition. Others have argued, however, that although 
the medial temporal lobes may show some functional heterogeneity, the available evidence does 
not support the view that familiarity-based recognition responses are independent of the 
hippocampus (Squire et al., 2007). 
Hippocampal involvement in the recollective component of recognition is consistent with a large 
body of evidence demonstrating its role in various aspects of associative memory, including 
contextual processing and retrieval (Hirsch, 1974; 1980; Selden at al., 1991; Kim & Fanselow, 
1992; Phillips & LeDoux, 1992), formation of configural associations (Sutherland & Rudy, 
1989) and storage of relational representations of items in memory (Cohen & Eichenbaum, 1993; 
Eichenbaum, Otto & Cohen, 1994; Chun & Phelps, 1999).  The overall agreement is that the 
hippocampus is required to form a flexible association between elements of a scene or event in 
which the elements can also be kept separate for use in different contexts or episodes (O’Reilly 
& Rudy, 2001). For example, recognising your postman in the local pub as well as at your 
doorstep! 
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Amnesic patients with damage to the hippocampal region show hyperspecificity in associative 
learning since retrieval of the associations can only occur under highly constrained conditions in 
which the material presented during the retrieval episode closely resembles that present during 
the learning episode (Glisky & Schacter, 1988; Thoene & Glisky, 1995). Eichenbaum & Bunsey 
(1995) proposed that, whereas the hippocampus facilitates a flexible association between items, 
the parahippocampal region mediates the encoding of elements as fused or unitized memory 
representations. These fused representations are inflexible, in that individual elements cannot be 
retrieved separately in a new context. Therefore, in the absence of a functional hippocampus, 
hyperspecificity results from fused representations that are encoded by one or more cortices 
within the parahippocampal region.  This proposal also has implications for performance on 
recognition memory tests when items and the context in which they appear are relevant for 
performance. A new combination of previously studied components could be fused into a novel 
representation and perceived as a new stimulus at recognition test. Thus, hippocampal-damaged 
patients/animals should respond to familiar yet recombined components of a stimulus as if they 
constitute a novel stimulus. Similarly, a familiar object displayed on a novel background (or on a 
familiar background previously paired with a different object) may be perceived as a novel 
stimulus because the object-background association constitutes a new, fused representation.  
Support for this view has been provided by studies of rats in which it has been demonstrated that 
hippocampal lesions disrupt place memory and context memory leaving object memory intact 
(Mumby et al., 2002). More specifically, using odor discrimination, Eichenbaum and colleagues 
(Bunsey & Eichenbaum, 1993; Sauvage et al., 2008) have demonstrated that the hippocampus is 
essential for the formation of flexible representations that allow responses to be made based on 
the relationship between separate components of a stimulus. The current study extends this work 
across species in an investigation of the role of the hippocampus in the formation of flexible 
representations comprising an object and its contextual background.  
The association between an item and its background context has been termed ‘contextual 
binding’ (Chalfonte & Johnson, 1996; Mitchell et al., 2000), and is thought to be mediated by the 
medial temporal lobe structures. Thus, monkeys with fornix transections are more severely 
impaired in object-in-place discrimination trials than on either object discrimination or place 
discrimination trials alone (Gaffan, 1994).  Similarly, activations of the hippocampus and 
parahippocampal cortex occur not only during effortful associative encoding of pictures (Henke 
et al., 1997, 1999; Montaldi et al., 1998) but also during incidental associations between objects 
and the context in which they are presented (Goh et al., 2004; Hayes et al., 2007). These findings 
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are consistent with the view that the hippocampus mediates the encoding of a flexible 
representation of the objects and their context such that responses to the objects or backgrounds 
can subsequently be made independently of the object/background compound. In contrast, the 
parahippocampal region mediates the encoding of an inflexible representation of the 
object/background compound fused into a single stimulus, like a snapshot. In this case an object 
cannot be responded to independently of its background, and presentation of a familiar object on 
a new background would be perceived as a new stimulus. 
To further substantiate this proposal, the aim of the present study is to investigate contextual 
binding in monkeys with lesions of the hippocampal formation and an amnesic patient (YR) who 
has a discrete hippocampal lesion using an incidental recognition task. The visual paired 
comparison task (VPC) exploits a subject’s natural tendency to look preferentially at novel 
stimuli relative to familiar stimuli. VPC task performance has been found to be sensitive to 
damage to the hippocampal formation in both amnesic patients (McKee & Squire, 1993; Pascalis 
et al., 2004) and adult monkeys (Pascalis & Bachevalier, 1999; Zola et al., 2000; Nemanic et al. 
2004) when increasing delays were used. In the present experiment, we manipulated the 
backgrounds onto which the objects appeared such that in some trials the backgrounds were 
identical during familiarization (study) and test, but on other trials they differed between 
familiarization and test (See Figure 1).  Incidental encoding and retrieval of object/background 
association was assessed in adult monkeys with neonatal hippocampal lesions and the amnesic 
patient (YR).  We predicted that, relative to controls, subjects with damage to the hippocampal 
formation will be selectively impaired on trials in which the backgrounds differed between 
familiarization and test. In other words, when the background context is kept constant between 
familiarization and test, all subjects will show a novelty preference, indicating memory for the 
familiar objects. However, when the background context is changed between familiarization and 
test, it is predicted that only the controls will show a novelty preference. It is predicted that the 
hippocampal-operated monkeys and patient YR will show null preference indicating that, for 
them, both a familiar object on a new background and a new object on a new background 
constitute novel stimuli. 
The use of the VPC task allows a direct comparison of performance in monkeys and humans, 
since the task and responses made by the two types of participant are identical. A major strength 
of this approach is that we can compare the performance of a human patient with presumed focal 
hippocampal pathology with a group of monkeys for whom the lesion is precise and, in one of 
the monkeys, histologically verified. 
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Figure 1 about here 
 
Experiment 1: Non-human primates 
Methods 
Subjects 
Six adult rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) participated in the present study.  Three monkeys (2 
males and 1 female) had received neonatal hippocampal lesions (Group H) and three (2 males 
and 1 female) were unoperated controls (Group N).  Subjects were 11 years of age and weighed 
3.8 – 7.1 kg at the beginning of the experiment.   
 All monkeys were born at the breeding colony of National Institute of Health Animal 
Center (Bethesda, MD) and raised in the primate nursery of the Laboratory of Neuropsychology 
(National Institute of Mental Health, Bethesda, MD).  During the first year of life, they were 
tested on a series of cognitive tasks including a concurrent object discrimination task (24-hr ITI) 
at the age of 3 months, and the object delayed nonmatching-to-sample (DNMS) task at 10 
months of age (Bachevalier et al., 1999).  In addition, their social interactions with peers were 
measured at 2 months, 6 months, and 5 years (Bachevalier, 1994).  Upon reaching adulthood, 
they were sent to the Department of Neurobiology and Anatomy (University of Texas, Houston) 
where they received further cognitive testing, which included re-tests on the 24-hr ITI and 
DNMS tasks at 6 and 7 years of age, respectively (Bachevalier et al., 1999), and training on 
Transverse Patterning and DNMS for locations task at 9 years of age (Alvarado, Wright & 
Bachevalier, 2002), before participating in the VPC task at 9 years of age (Pascalis & 
Bachevalier, 1999).   
At the time of testing, the monkeys were housed in individual cages and maintained on a diet of 
Purina Monkey Chow plus fresh food.  Water was always available, except for 5 hours prior to 
testing.  The study was approved by the Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee of the 
University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston, TX, USA.  
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Surgery and verification of the lesion 
The surgical procedure and the extent of brain damage of the operated animals has been 
described in detail in Bachevalier et al. (1999), although only cases H-1, H-4 and H-6, 
participated in the present experiment. Briefly, a two-stage aspiration lesion was performed 
aseptically under anesthesia when the animals were approximately 7 and 20 days old. The 
hippocampal removal included the dentate gyrus, all CA fields, the subicular complex as well as 
the underlying parahippocampal cortex (cortical areas TH and TF) lying medial to the 
occipitotemporal sulcus. The extent of the lesions was verified histologically in one case (see 
case H-6, Bachevalier et al., 1999) and through Magnetic Resonance Imaging in the two 
remaining cases (cases H-1 and H-4, Bachevalier et al., 1999) when the animals were 5-7 years 
old.  In all cases, the lesions were as intended, and included the hippocampus proper, subicular 
complex, and a portion of cortical areas TH and TF.  The entorhinal cortical area 28 and 
perirhinal cortical areas 35 and 36 were spared, except for the most caudal dorsomedial portion 
of the entorhinal cortex, bilaterally in cases H-4 and H-6, and unilaterally in case H-1.  Finally, 
small unintended damage was found in the inferior temporal cortical area TEO, unilaterally in 
cases H-4 and H-6 and bilaterally in case H-1.  This damage was judged to be potentially 
significant only in case H-1 where it extended caudally on the ventromedial surface of the right 
hemisphere to include the occipital cortex (see Fig. 3, Bachevalier et al., 1999). 
Stimuli 
The stimuli were coloured slides of objects. They were sorted into pairs which were matched for 
size, brightness and complexity, and the objects were shown either on plain coloured 
backgrounds (e.g., blue) or on coloured wallpaper patterns. Each stimulus measured 
approximately 10cm by 10cm. In the ‘same context’ condition, the background remained the 
same between familiarization and test.  In the ‘different context’ condition, the background was 
changed between familiarization and test, i.e. different colour (e.g., yellow) or different pattern. 
All backgrounds were novel and had not been presented before. See Figure 1 for examples of 
stimuli used in the two conditions. 
Apparatus 
 Behavioral testing was carried out in a standard Wisconsin General Testing Apparatus 
(WGTA) located inside a darkened sound-shielded room.  A white-noise generator provided 
extraneous sound masking.  As previously described (Pascalis & Bachevalier, 1998; 1999), a 
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Plexiglas cage was used to constrain the monkey during behavioural testing.  The front of the 
cage was positioned 30 cm in front of a translucent screen onto which the stimuli (slides of 
objects) were rear projected.  At the centre-front of the cage, a sipper tube was attached and 
delivered orange juice during training to keep the animal facing the translucent screen and to 
allow capture of the monkey’s eye movements via a camera mounted above the screen during 
stimulus presentation.   
 Procedure 
 The animals had already been trained to perform the task. They were required to sit 
quietly at the front of the cage and to drink from the sipper tube while looking at stimuli (see 
Pascalis and Bachevalier, 1999).    Each trial involved new stimuli and comprised two parts: 
familiarization (or study) and test.  During familiarization, a sample stimulus was presented in 
the middle of the screen. The stimulus remained on the screen until the monkey had looked at it 
for a total cumulative time of 20 seconds.  Measurements of the cumulative looking time at the 
stimulus during the familiarization period were made by the experimenter watching the 
monkey’s fixation on the stimulus displayed on a TV monitor. The length of the familiarization 
phase was recorded for each trial.   
After a 5-second retention interval, during which the participant’s view of the stimulus was 
prevented, the participant was confronted with the familiarized stimulus presented together with 
a new stimulus, for two successive recognition tests. These two recognition tests were separated 
by a 5-second interval, in which the left/right position of the stimuli on the screen was reversed 
to minimise lateral bias. The retention interval used for the recognition tests was selected from 
our previous study (Pascalis & Bachevalier, 1999) showing that animals with a lesion of the 
hippocampal formation can demonstrate a novelty preference with delays up to 10 seconds. The 
two recognition tests, each of which lasted 5 seconds, began when the monkey started to look at 
one of the two stimuli.  In the recognition test, the backgrounds onto which the familiar and 
novel objects were presented were either identical (same context condition) or different (different 
context condition) to those onto which the objects had been previously presented in the 
familiarization phase. Ten trials were run for each condition.  
The time spent looking at each stimulus (novel or familiar) during the two recognition tests was 
measured with the aid of a frame by frame video-recording system, which allowed detailed 
analyses of the corneal reflection of the stimuli (see Pascalis & Bachevalier, 1999).  
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Results 
Length of familiarization period 
The total amount of time needed to reach the criterion of 20 cumulative seconds spent looking at 
each stimulus did not differ between groups across the two context conditions (same: t(18)=.84, 
NS; different: t(18)=.91, NS). For the control monkeys, it averaged 28.1 seconds (SD 9.3) and 
30.7 seconds (SD 12.0) for the same and different context conditions, respectively. For the 
operated monkeys, it averaged 31.5 seconds (SD 8.75) and 35.7 seconds (SD 12.38) for the same 
and different context conditions, respectively. 
Total looking time during the two recognition tests 
 For each of the two background conditions, the total time spent looking at the two stimuli 
during the two recognition tests was summed and then averaged across the 10 trials.  The two 
groups explored the stimuli for a similar amount of time in each background condition (same: 
t(18)=.07, NS; different: t(18)=-.23, NS). For the control animals, mean total looking time was 
2.67 (SD 1.31) and 2.39 (SD 1.16) seconds for the same context and different context conditions, 
respectively. For the operated animals, mean total looking time was 2.62 (SD 1.41) and 2.51 (SD 
1.00) seconds for the same context and different context conditions, respectively.  
Percent time looking at each stimulus during the two recognition tests 
 To determine novelty preference in the two groups of monkeys, the proportion of time 
spent looking at the novel stimuli was analysed for each trial in each condition. Novelty 
preference was defined as the time spent looking at the novel stimulus as a proportion of the total 
looking time during the retention test. The mean percent time spent looking at novel stimuli in 
the same context and different context conditions for each group is shown in Table 1A.  A two-
way ANOVA using group (control/hippocampal) and condition (same context/different context) 
as main factors revealed that both main effects were significant (group: F(1,4) = 11.730, p = 
.0267; condition: F (1,4) = 24.883, p = .0076). This reflected an overall greater novelty 
preference in the control animals relative to the operated animals, and greater novelty preference 
in the same context condition than in the different context condition. Of critical importance was 
the significant group x condition interaction (F(1,4) = 21.470, p = .0098). One-way ANOVAs 
were carried out for each condition separately and indicated that, in the same context condition 
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the two groups did not differ, but in the different context condition the controls showed greater 
novelty preference than the hippocampal-operated animals (see Table 1A). 
Additional t-tests were carried out to determine whether or not novelty preference exhibited by 
each monkey was significantly above chance. Whereas each control animal in each condition 
showed a novelty preference that was significantly above chance (all ps < .025, one tailed), the 
hippocampal-operated monkeys' novelty preference was significantly above chance in the 'same 
context' condition (all ps < .025, one tailed), but not in the 'different context' condition  (all ps > 
.10, one tailed). 
Table 1A. Mean percent fixation time (SD) for novel pictures during retention test in monkeys 
Condition Group N Group H F-ratio (df 1, 
4) 
Probability 
Same context 61.47 (2.48) 60.95 (1.69) .093 .7760 
 
Different 
context 
61.08 (0.87) 50.26 (3.76) 23.582 .0083 
Table 1B. Mean percent fixation time (SD) for novel pictures during retention test in YR and 
Controls  
Condition Controls YR t value Probability 
Same context 62.86 (13.83) 67.73 (18.35) -.870 0.199 
Different 
context 
63.06 (13.44) 51.68 (21.49) 1.765 0.050 
 
 
Experiment 2: Patient YR 
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Methods 
Subjects 
The subjects were patient YR and five age- and IQ-matched healthy control subjects. YR is a 62 
year old female who has a memory impairment following a possible ischaemic infarct, arising 
from the administration of an opiate drug to relieve severe back pain 14 years previously in 
1986. YR's neuropathology and neuropsychological profile are reported in detail by Holdstock, 
Mayes, Cezayirli et al. (2000) and Mayes, Holdstock, Isaac et al. (2004). For clarification, an 
overview of YR’s neuropathological and neuropsychological details is included here. 
Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) was carried out in September 1997 using a 1.5T SIGNA 
whole-body magnetic imaging system (General Electric, Milwaukee, WI). A 3D T1-weighted 
radio-frequency spoiled gradient echo (SPGR) image revealed a selective lesion affecting the 
hippocampus bilaterally along its full anterior-posterior extent. Volumetric analysis indicated 
that the volumes of the hippocampi (corrected for intracranial volume) were 2.5 and 3 SDs 
smaller than the mean volumes in a group of healthy controls subjects (matched for sex, age and 
IQ) on the right and left, respectively. In contrast, there was no pathology evident in the 
parahippocampal gyrus, and the corrected volume of this region, which included the perirhinal, 
entorhinal and parahippocampal cortices, was at least 1 SD greater than that of the control 
subjects. Although the amygdala appeared small, there was no evidence of pathology. Frontal 
lobe structures were intact, and grey to white matter ratios were normal. There was some 
evidence of parietal lobe atrophy, but this was not atypical for a woman of YR's age, and her 
corrected parietal lobe volume was within the control range on the right, and only just below the 
control range on the left. 
YR's memory performance has been reported extensively (Mayes et al., 2001, 2002, 2004; 
Holdstock, Mayes, Roberts et al., 2002), and is briefly summarised here. Her current FSIQ 
(WAIS-R; Wechsler, 1981), measured at the time of scanning, was in the average range (FSIQ 
102). Although this represented a decrement of 13 points from her estimated pre-morbid IQ 
(115; NART; Nelson, 1991), this was a drop of less than 1 SD in IQ points. On tests of memory 
function, YR showed a consistent pattern in that she had a severe impairment on tests of verbal 
and non-verbal recall, but relatively intact performance on tests of verbal and non-verbal item 
recognition. This pattern of impairment is shown clearly by her performance on the Doors and 
People Test (Baddeley, Emslie & Nimmo-Smith, 1994) on which she scored below the fifth 
percentile on tests of verbal and visual recall (Scaled scores: People 4; Shapes 5), but at the 50th 
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percentile or above on tests of verbal and visual recognition (Scaled scores: Names 16; Doors 9). 
Similarly, her performance on the Warrington Recognition Memory Test (WRMT; Warrington, 
1984) was above the 50th percentile for both verbal and visual subtests (Scaled scores: 11 and 16, 
respectively). On the Wechsler Memory Scale-Revised (WMS-R; Wechsler, 1987), which tends 
to rely more heavily on recall, she showed impairment on the Verbal Memory (62), General (66) 
and Delay (73) indexes. In contrast, her Visual Memory (102) and Attention indexes (112) were 
at, or above, average. YR’s good Visual Memory index contrasts with her impaired visual recall 
score on the Doors and People Test, and may have been influenced by the recognition scores 
contributing to this index. Mayes et al. (2002) have confirmed the dissociation that YR shows 
between visual and verbal recall and recognition using over 70 recall and recognition tests. In 
particular, this study confirmed that YR’s recall of several kinds of visual test materials is clearly 
impaired. Using another large battery of tests, Mayes et al. (2004) have shown that YR’s 
recognition of associations between items of the same kind was relatively preserved whereas her 
recognition of associations between different kinds of information (for example, faces and 
voices) was as impaired as her recall. In addition to tests of memory, YR's perceptual function 
was assessed with the Visual Object and Space Perception Battery (VOSP; Warrington & James, 
1991). YR scored within 1 SD of the mean of the normative sample for all subtests. (See 
Footnote.) 
Five control participants were recruited. These were healthy, female volunteers who were 
matched to YR in terms of age (mean age 63.20 years, SD 2.17) and WAIS-R FSIQ (mean IQ 
101.60, SD 5.03). These participants were the same as those reported in a separate study by 
Pascalis et al. (2004). 
Stimuli 
A new set of stimuli produced in the same way as those used in Experiment 1 was created to 
measure visual recognition memory in our amnesic patient and her controls. (See Figure 1.) 
Procedure 
YR and the controls were investigated individually. Experimental conditions were as follows: 
First, each participant was shown a single target stimulus to inspect during a 5 second 
familiarization period. After a very brief delay during which a blank screen was presented 
(approximately 1 second, the time taken to change the slide), the participant was shown the 
target object paired with a new stimulus, for 5 seconds. The length of the familiarization period 
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and the retention interval were chosen from our previous study (Pascalis et al., 2004), which 
showed that these conditions were sufficient to elicit a novelty preference in YR and her controls 
at short delays. The left-right position of the novel stimulus was counterbalanced across trials. 
As in Experiment 1, for 12 trials the background onto which the familiar and novel stimuli were 
shown was identical to the background used in the familiarization phase (same context 
condition) and for the remaining 12 trials the background was different (different context 
condition). Trials from the two conditions were mixed and presented in random order. 
Participants were told that they were part of a vision study, and we explained to YR that she was 
the control of a patient with a visual problem. Participants were told that one picture would 
appear on the screen followed by a brief period of rest, then two pictures would be 
simultaneously presented. Participants were asked to “look at the screen as if you were watching 
TV". The dependent variable was actual looking time directed to the new (novel) and to the old 
(familiar) stimulus. 
A video camera with a videotimer was fixed above the screen and recorded participants’ eye 
movements onto videotape. Stimulus fixation was indicated by corneal reflection of the stimuli. 
Inspection of the videotape after the experiment allowed the time spent inspecting the right and 
left images in the 5-second recognition phase to be measured. 
 
Results 
Length of familiarization period and total looking time during the recognition tests 
Each participant spent 100% of the 5-second familiarization period looking at the stimulus and 
spent more than 95% of their time looking at either the familiar or the novel picture during the 
recognition tests. 
Percent of time looking at each stimulus during the recognition test 
To determine whether there was a significant difference between the novelty preference of YR 
and that of the control subjects, the proportion of time spent looking at the novel stimuli was 
analysed. As in Experiment 1, novelty preference was defined as the time spent looking at the 
novel stimulus as a proportion of the total looking time. This was calculated for each subject on 
each of the 12 trials in each condition. YR's novelty preference in each condition was then 
compared with that of the control subjects using a t-test. Since it cannot be assumed that the 
14 
variance of YR's performance was equivalent to that of the group of control subjects, Welch's 
procedure was adopted, which tests for the significance of the difference between means when 
the population variances are unequal (Ferguson, 1976; p168). The results of this analysis are 
shown in Table 1B. YR showed a similar novelty preference to that of the controls in the 'same 
context' condition, but showed a significant difference from the controls in the 'different context' 
condition.  
Additional t-tests were carried out to determine whether or not the novelty preference exhibited 
by YR and the control subjects was significantly above chance. The results indicated that, 
whereas each control subject in each condition showed a novelty preference that was 
significantly above chance (all ps<.025, one-tailed), YR's novelty preference was significantly 
above chance in the 'same context' condition (t(11) = 3.346, p < .005), but not in the 'different 
context' condition (t(11) = 0.271, p > .10). 
 
General Discussion 
In Experiment 1, both monkeys with neonatal hippocampal lesions (which included a portion of 
the parahippocampal region) and controls showed a novelty preference when objects’ 
background context remained the same between familiarization and recognition tests. In contrast, 
only the control animals showed a novelty preference when the background context was 
modified between familiarization and recognition tests; under these conditions, monkeys with 
hippocampal lesions demonstrated a novelty preference that was not significantly above chance. 
A similar pattern of results was observed in Experiment 2. Both YR and her control subjects 
showed a significant novelty preference when the background context was consistent between 
familiarization and recognition tests. However, when the background context was modified 
between familiarization and test, only the controls showed a significant novelty preference. The 
results of the two experiments are therefore consistent. Furthermore, in both experiments, 
controls demonstrated the same degree of novelty preference in the two experimental conditions. 
This rules out an explanation that the absence of a novelty preference in the lesioned subjects in 
the different context condition is simply due to the relative difference in the novelty of the paired 
stimuli. 
Given that the lesion in the operated monkeys included not only the hippocampus but also the 
parahippocampal cortex, either (or both) of these structures may be critical for novelty 
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preference when an object’s background is changed between familiarization and test. However, 
there is no evidence that the parahippocampal cortex is damaged in patient YR. Since YR and 
the operated monkeys show an identical pattern of VPC performance, it seems plausible that it is 
the integrity of the hippocampus that is critical for novelty preference following a change in 
background context. 
As suggested in the Introduction, a plausible interpretation of these results is that selective 
hippocampal lesions disrupt the ability to create flexible, recollection-supporting representations 
of associations between pictures of objects and their background context. Monkeys and humans 
with such lesions can only form fused associative memory representations such that the different 
elements of these representations cannot be attended to separately. Consequently, each newly 
formed associative representation is experienced as novel even when one of the elements is 
familiar. In contrast, for the control subjects, it is possible to attend selectively to different 
elements of flexible associative representations. So newly formed associative representations, 
which depend on the hippocampus, may be experienced as old if at least one of their elements 
has just been studied. This is particularly pertinent for objects as these are more likely to draw 
attention than background context.  
Based on the VPC data, neither the hippocampal-operated monkeys nor YR seemed to 
experience studied objects paired with a new background context as old, even following very 
short, unfilled delays. This suggests that the hippocampal-operated monkeys and YR may have 
been impaired not only at creating long-term flexible object-context memories, but also at 
creating short-term flexible object-context memories. Mayes et al.’s (2004) findings on YR’s 
associative recognition support this interpretation. In this study, YR was found to be impaired at 
recognition of associations between different kinds of information, such as pictures of scenes and 
environmental sounds, even at unfilled delays of a few seconds. It was argued that, in normal 
subjects, these memory representations are mediated by recollection and are therefore highly 
flexible. Object-background context associations are also associations between different kinds of 
information so YR would also probably have failed to create stable and flexible object-context 
representations in the current experiment. Given the very short delays at which YR (and the 
hippocampal-operated monkeys) showed their deficits, this would suggest that they could not 
form normal short-term memory, let alone long-term memory, representations of object-context 
associations that have flexibly accessible components. This proposal is consistent with recent 
findings from both lesion studies (Hannula, Tranel & Cohen, 2006; Olson, Page, Moore et al., 2006) 
and neuroimaging studies (Hannula & Ranganath, 2008) that have demonstrated hippocampal 
involvement in relational memory at short lags.  
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Our results appear inconsistent with those of Ryan and Cohen (2004). Using an eye tracking device 
with a ‘change blindness’ procedure, Ryan and Cohen showed that, although amnesic patients failed 
to show memory for the relations between elements of a scene over a long delay, these patients 
(including a patient with discrete hippocampal damage) performed similarly to controls over short 
delays (mean 1.77 seconds). This pattern of results contrasts with our current findings that both YR 
and the hippocampal-operated monkeys were impaired relative to controls at a very short delay. 
This apparent inconsistency may be explained by considering the type of representation that 
subjects’ responses may be based upon in the two studies. In the current study, we suggested that in 
the absence of a functional hippocampus, YR and the operated monkeys form an inflexible, unitized 
representation of an object on its original background. When the background is consistent between 
familiarization and test, subjects indicate that the previously viewed object is a familiar stimulus by 
gazing preferentially at the novel object. In contrast, when the background is modified between 
familiarization and test, subjects respond as if the familiar object on a new background is a novel 
stimulus, by showing null preference at test. In the study of Ryan and Cohen, the amnesic patients 
may also form an inflexible, unitized representation of the scene they are viewing. Thus, when 
subjects were presented with a slightly modified scene, in which some of the elements of the scene 
had been added, deleted or changed location, they could utilize this unitized representation (at an 
unconscious level) to direct their eye movements. These eye movements reflected increased looking 
in the area where the change occurred, and suggests short-term retention of relational information 
may be accessed from a unitized representation. This view would appear to be consistent with the 
results of Haskins et al. (2008) which demonstrated that the perirhinal cortex is involved in a 
unitized encoding of novel associations. According to Haskins and colleagues, the perirhinal cortex 
supports associative recognition when responses can be based on familiarity. Alternatively, it may 
be the nature of the task that is critical in explaining the discrepancy between our present findings 
and those of Ryan and Cohen (2004). It is possible that the hippocampus is essential for relational 
memory but not for online processing of relationships between stimulus components. The viewing 
of sequential scenes in the Ryan and Cohen study may place more emphasis on online processing, 
whereas the VPC procedure in which subjects’ relative gaze at one of two stimuli with varying 
degrees of familiarity may place more emphasis on short-term relational memory. 
Our results are consistent with a growing body of evidence indicating that the hippocampus is 
critical to form flexible representation of objects and the environments in which they occur. (See 
Eichenbaum et al., 2007 and Diana et al., 2007 for reviews.) As indicated in the Introduction, it 
is proposed that recognition involves two independent processes, recollection and familiarity; 
recollection relies upon the integrity of the hippocampus whereas familiarity relies upon the 
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integrity of the perirhinal cortex. According to Eichenbaum et al. (2007), information about a 
given stimulus is processed by the perirhinal and lateral entorhinal cortices, information about 
the context surrounding the stimulus is processed by the parahippocampal and medial entorhinal 
cortices, and these two sets of information converge in the hippocampus. Thus, the hippocampus 
is involved in processing information about an item and its context. When a previously 
encountered stimulus is presented, it is processed by the perirhinal and lateral entorhinal cortices 
which can signal a match to a pre-existing representation. According to Eichenbaum et al. 
(2007), this match signal can be propagated back to neocortical areas where it elicits a sense of 
familiarity. Eichenbaum et al. also suggest that presentation of a previously encountered stimulus 
elicits the recovery of object-context associations within the hippocampus; back-propagation (via 
the parahippocampal and medial entorhinal cortices) to neocortical areas in which the context 
was originally processed can give rise to recollection. A possible mechanism for the matching 
procedure underlying familiarity and recollection may be pattern completion which has been 
associated with activity not only in the hippocampus, but also in the entorhinal and 
parahippocampal cortices (Bakker et al., 2008). 
In terms of the current study, the perirhinal cortex (which is presumed to be intact in both patient 
YR and the operated monkeys) is sufficient to support recognition when an object is presented 
on the same background at familiarization and test. However, the representation formed by the 
perirhinal cortex does not have the flexibility to allow recognition when the background is 
changed. Whether or not this pattern of results extends to tests of explicit memory is an 
interesting question. In an earlier study (Pascalis et al., 2004), we observed intact performance 
on a delayed matching to sample task despite impaired performance on a VPC task at the same 
delay. It is possible that instructing patient YR to try and remember the object on each trial may 
be sufficient to direct her attention to that object such that she is able to select that object using 
familiarity in a subsequent forced-choice recognition test.  
Finally, we can make predictions about the effect of background variability on VPC 
performance. Eichenbaum et al. (2007) propose that the parahippocampal cortex is involved in 
processing contextual information before this information converges with item information 
within the hippocampus. It would be useful to examine VPC performance further under 
conditions in which an item was presented repeatedly on a series of novel backgrounds. It is 
predicted that the parahippocampal cortex would be sensitive to this continued change in 
background. Since the parahippocampal cortex is intact in patient YR, but is damaged in our 
hipppocampal-operated monkeys, we would predict that YR would develop a novelty preference 
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across trials in which the background continually changed, whereas the operated monkeys would 
not. 
19 
Footnote 
Since the psychometric data reported here were collected, YR's performance on a range of tests 
of intelligence, perception and memory has shown deterioration, and she is currently being 
investigated clinically for a dementing illness. However, there is no evidence that YR's pattern of 
memory impairment during the course of the current study (1999-2000) differed from the 
psychometric profile reported here or from the pattern of memory deficit reported by Mayes et 
al. (2002; 2004). To the contrary, as indicated in Pascalis et al. (2004), we have evidence that on 
reassessment at the end of 2000, YR's visual recognition, at least for faces, was intact.   
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Figure 1. Examples of stimuli used in the (a) same context and (b) different context conditions in 
both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. 
 
